Cartel damages claims and the passing-on defense. by Verboven, Frank & Van Dijk, T
 
 















Center for Economic Studies 




May 2007 Cartel damages claims and the passing-on defense
FrankVerbov en and Theon v an Dij k 
May2 0 0 7
Abstract
We dev elop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims
b ypurchaser plainti¤s.We decompose the lost prots from the cartel in three parts:
the direct cost e¤ect ( or anticompetitiv e price ov ercharge) ,the pass-on e¤ect and the
usuallyneglected output e¤ect.The pass-on e¤ect is the ex tent to which the plainti¤
passes on the price ov ercharge b yraising its own price,and the output e¤ect is the
lost business resulting from this passing-on.We subseq uentlyintroduce v arious models
of imperfect competition for the plainti¤ s industry .This enables us to ev aluate the
relativ e importance of the cost,pass-on and output e¤ects.We show that an adj usted
passing-on defense ( i. e. accounting for the output e¤ect)is j ustied under a wide
v arietyof circumstances,prov ided that su¢cientlymanyrms in the plainti¤ s mark et
are a¤ected b ythe cartel.We deriv e ex act discounts to the direct cost e¤ect,which
depend on relativ elyeasy -to-observ e v ariables,such as the pass-on rate,the number
of rms,the number of rms a¤ected b y the cartel,and/ or the mark et shares. We
nallyex tend our frameworkto assess the cartel s total harm,further demonstrating
the crucial importance of the output e¤ect. Our results are particularlyrelev ant in
light of the recent dev elopments b yU. S.and European antitrust authorities to mak e
cartel damages claims more in line with actuallylost prots.
Frank Verboven: Catholic Univ ersity of Leuv en and C. E. P. R. ( London) . Email:
Frank . Verbov en@econ. k uleuv en. be. Th eon van Di j k: Lex onomics.Email: t. v andij k @lex onomics. com.
Part of this studywas carried out while Theon v an Dij kwas a v isiting Research Fellow at the Univ ersityof
Antwerp.1 Introduction
The anticompetitive price overcharge has been commonly used as a basis for computing
damages claims in price-xing cartels. There is, however, an ongoing debate as to whether
the cartel members may resort to a passing-on defense. Such a defense entails the argument
that the purchaser plainti¤ may have passed on part of the cartels price overcharge to its
own customers and correspondingly su¤ered lower losses than the overcharge. Both U.S. and
European antitrust authorities have recently shown a renewed interest in properly assessing
cartel damages, including the possible consideration of the passing-on defense.1
Against this background we develop a general economic framework for computing cartel
damages. We decompose the purchaser plainti¤s lost prots from the cartel into a direct
and two indirect e¤ects. First, the direct cost e¤ect is the anticompetitive price overcharge
su¤ered by the plainti¤, multiplied by the number of units purchased at that price. Second,
the pass-on e¤ect re ects the extent to which the purchaser can shift the burden of the price
overcharge to its own customers. Third, the usually neglected output e¤ect refers to the
sales that may be lost when part of the price overcharge is passed on to the customers.
We then introduce various models of imperfect competition to describe the industry in
which the purchaser plainti¤ operates. This enables us to evaluate the relative importance
of the cost, pass-on and output e¤ects from the cartel. Consistent with common practice we
take the direct cost e¤ect (price overcharge) as the basis for computing damages and show
how to compute a discount to this direct cost e¤ect. This discount captures the pass-on
e¤ect but suitably adjusted for the output e¤ect. We rst consider the case of a common
cost increase, in which all competitors in the plainti¤s industry are a¤ected by the cartel.
We show that in this case the discount to the cartels direct cost e¤ect is generally positive,
unless the plainti¤ operates itself in a fully carteliz ed industry. This motivates an adjusted
passing-on defense, where the adjustment factor re ects the output e¤ect and depends on
the intensity of competition, as illustrated for Bertrand or Cournot industries.
We next consider the case of a rm-specic cost increase, in which not necessarily all of
the plainti¤s competitors are a¤ected by the cartel. This is relevant in several circumstances,
for example when some of the cartel members are vertically integrated and do not overcharge
their own downstream units. I n this case the output e¤ect becomes more important, because
the plainti¤ may now also lose business to its una¤ected competitors within the industry, in
addition to losing business outside the industry. We show that an adjusted passing-on defense
1The U.S. Antitrust Moderniz ation Commission (2007) has recently recommended to make cartel damages
claims in line with lost prots, implying the possibility of a passing-on defense. The European Commission
(2005 ) issued a Green Paper on private cartel damages and the possibility of a passing on defense. We review
these developments against the history of previous case law in section 2.
1remains economically justied in a Bertrand industry. In a Cournot industry, however, the
passing-on defense becomes invalid if there are su¢ciently many una¤ected competitors,
since these respond expansively to the output contractions of the plainti¤ and other a¤ected
rms. For both the Bertrand and the Cournot models we derive exact discounts to the
cartels direct cost e¤ect when the adjusted passing-on defense is justied. These discounts
are easy to interpret and depend on observable variables for the plainti¤s industry, such as
the pass-on rate, the total number of rms, the number of rms a¤ected by the cartel, the
plainti¤s and/or the other rms market shares.
Most previous research has focused on the law and economics of the passing-on defense,
providing informational and incentive arguments for or against a passing-on defense in cartel
damages cases.2 In contrast, we focus on the economic e¤ects and stress the essential impor-
tance of the output e¤ect whenever the passing-on defense is considered. To our knowledge
there are only a few recent papers which explicitly elaborate on the output (or  lost busi-
ness ) e¤ect, in particular Kosicki and Cahill (2006 ) and Hellwig (2006 ). These papers focus
on the case in which the plainti¤s industry is itself fully cartelized (so that the passing-on
defense becomes invalid), or consider some other special cases with graphical or numerical
analysis. In contrast, our framework shows how it is possible to incorporate the output
e¤ect in a wide variety of oligopoly industries, with and without the possibility that some
of the plainti¤s competitors are not a¤ected by the cartel. We show that the informational
requirements in implementing a passing-on defense increase only moderately relative to the
case in which the output e¤ect is ignored.
Our paper focuses on the cartel damages to a purchaser plainti¤. In a recent paper Basso
and Ross (2007) assess the total harm of the cartel, i.e. the e¤ects on all purchaser plainti¤s
and their (nal) consumers. They show that this total harm is generally higher than what we
call the direct cost e¤ect. At the end of the paper, we show how to extend our own framework
to assess the cartels total harm. We show that the output e¤ect is the crucial explanation
for why the cartels total harm exceeds the direct cost e¤ect. Hence, an adjusted passing-on
defense may actually turn against the defendant, since the evidence required to adjust for
the output e¤ect may also be used to demonstrate by how much the total harm exceeds the
direct cost e¤ect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous practices towards cartel
2Landes and Posner (19 79 ) advance several arguments why damages claims by direct purchasers without
a passing-on defence are more reliable and hence have a better deterrence e¤ect. Harris and Sullivan (19 79 ),
in contrast, argue in favour of the passing-on defense to ensure a correct damages compensation. In an
interesting recent paper Schinkel et al. show how the cartel may have an incentive to  bribedirect purchasers
not to bring damages claims if indirect purchasers cannot bring damages claims. See van Dijk and Verboven
(2007) for a more detailed overview of these arguments.
2damages claims and the passing-on defense. Section 3 presents the general economic frame-
work, decomposing the plainti¤s lost prots in a cost, pass-on and output e¤ect. Section
4 considers the case of a common cost increase (to all of the plainti¤s competitors), and
section 5 the case of a rm-specic cost increase (to a subset of the plainti¤s competitors).
Section 6 considers total harm. Section 7 concludes.
2 State of play in the U.S. and Europe
We briey review the history and logic of cartel damages claims, with a focus on the passing-
on defense. For a more detailed discussion, we refer to the references in this section, and the
large literature they cite.
United States The current situation in the U.S. is the result of three major Supreme Court
decisions, Hanover Shoe, I l l inoisBric k, and ARC Americ a, and subsequent legislations by
the states.3 In the Hanover Shoe decision of 1968the defendant argued that the overcharged
purchaser plainti¤ does not su¤er losses if the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the
purchasers competitors and if the demand is so inelastic that the purchasers can pass on the
overcharge without su¤ering a decline in sales. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
on the grounds of insurmountable practical di¢culties in proving that the purchaser indeed
passed on the price overcharge and how this passing-on would a¤ect sales. Furthermore, it
considered that the indirect purchasers tend to be too dispersed and too weak to subsequently
recover any damages resulting from the passing-on by the direct purchasers, implying that
the cartel o¤enders might get o¤ too lightly. In the I l l inoisBric k decision of 1977 the
Court continued this logic and denied indirect purchasers the right to claim damages, since
the Hanover Shoe decision already made the cartel liable for the full damages to direct
purchasers.4
There was considerable opposition against I l l inoisBric k in the decade following the
decision. Congress was not able to pass any bills to overturn the decision, but in the ARC
3The three cases are Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 48 1 (1968 ) and Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (198 9).
4Interestingly, J ustice White, who delivered the opinion of the Court in I l l inoisBric k, points at two
complicating factors in practice that are assumed away in the economists hypothetical model (original
wording from the Hanover Shoe decision): Overcharged direct purchasers often sell in imperfectly com-
petitive markets. They often compete with other sellers that have not been subject to the overcharge ...
(see http://www.ripon.edu/Faculty/bowenj/antitrust/ilbrvill.htm). Our paper deals with precisely these
two factors: section 4 focuses on imperfect competition, and section 5 adds complications relating to the fact
that not all competitors may be subject to the overcharge.
3America decision of 1989 the Supreme Court legitimized indirect purchaser suits in state
courts. Furthermore, various states have passed Illinois Brick repealer laws or used existing
consumer protection statutes to permit indirect purchasers to bring damages claims against
cartels;see Hussain, Garrett and Howell (2001). As discussed in Kosicki and Cahill (2006)
several of these states also entitled the defendant to resort to a passing-on defense against
these indirect purchasers.
Under the current situation the direct purchasers can thus in principle claim the full
amount of the cartel damages (whether or not passed on to indirect purchasers), and the
indirect purchasers may obtain a duplicate part of that amount, i.e. their own lost prots.
While there do not appear to be cases in which this has lead to an overcompensation of all
parties a¤ected by the cartel, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007) has recently
recommended to make direct and indirect purchaser damages claims more in line with their
actually lost prots from the cartel. If these recommendations will be followed, this opens
the door for a passing-on defense, not just against the indirect but also against the direct
purchasers of a cartel.
Europe The experience with private antitrust damages cases in Europe has been rather
limited. There is, however, extensive case law in other areas, for example in cases where
undertakings claim restitution of illegal duties and levies from the state. As discussed in
Norberg (2005), in the notable Comat eb decision of 1997, the European Court of Justice
accepted that a passing-on defense was compatible with Community Law, but also claried
that the plainti¤ may have su¤ered damage as a result of the very fact that he passed on
the charge ... because the increase in price has led to a decrease in sales.5
Only very recently, in the important Cou rag e decision of 2001, the European Court of
Justice conrmed that infringements of Art. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty provide a legal
basis for bringing damages claims in antitrust infringements.6 Following this decision the
European Commission put private cartel damages claims and the possible consideration of a
passing-on defense as a high priority on the agenda. It requested the Ashurst study on private
enforcement of competition policy in 2004.7 This lead to the European Commissions (2005)
Green Paper on damages actions for breach of antitrust rules, which includes a discussion
on the role of the passing-on defense. Interestingly, the Commission writes: It can be said
that there is no passing on defense in Community law;rather, there is an unjust enrichment
defense which requires (1) proof of passing on ... and (2) proof of no reduction in sales
5Joined cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Socié t éComat eb, 1997 ECR I 165, CJ (http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=CELEX:61995J0192:EN:HTML).
6C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan 2001 ECR I-6297 CJ.
7The legal part of the Ashurst study was written by Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan (2004).
4or other reduction to income (European Commission, 2005, p. 48). One may interpret
this unjust enrichment defense as an adjusted version of the passing-on defense, which also
accounts for the additional output e¤ect following pass-on. Our own analysis will show
how to implement such an adjusted passing-on defense in a wide variety of competitive
circumstances.
3 General economic framework
This section decomposes the purchaser plainti¤s lost prots from the cartel into three e¤ects:
the cost, pass-on and output e¤ects. At this point our only assumptions are that the plainti¤
takes its input prices as given, including the price of the input purchased from the cartel, and
chooses its input mix to minimize its total costs. We do not yet make specic assumptions
on the nature of competition in the plainti¤s industry.
Consider a plainti¤ rm selling q units of total output at a price p in the but-for world,
i.e. without the cartel. The plainti¤ chooses its inputs to minimize its total costs, subject to
a standard production function technology. One of its inputs is the cartelized input, of which
it purchases x units at an input price w in the absense of the cartel. Write the plainti¤s cost
function C (w; q) as a function of w and q, and omit the other input prices as arguments.
The plainti¤s prots  in the but-for world, i.e. without the cartel, are simply total revenues
minus total costs:
 = pq   C (w; q):






















Equation (1) shows that the change in the plainti¤s prots due to the cartel can be decom-
posed into three components.
Direct cost e¤ect The rst term ( xdw) is the direct cost e¤ect. It is the price overcharge
dw (the cartel input price minus the but-for input price), multiplied by the total inputs x
purchased from the cartel. This cost e¤ect is obviously negative.
5Pass-on e¤ect The second term (qdp) is the pass-on e¤ect. It is the increase in revenue
that follows if the plainti¤ passes part of the input price increase on to its customers in
the form of a higher output price dp. The pass-on is typically positive (dp > 0), thus
counteracting at least part the direct damages from the price overcharge dw.






dq is the output e¤ect. It refers to the lost
prots associated with any lost sales dq following the higher output price set by the plainti¤.
This e¤ect is typically negative (dq < 0), especially if the plainti¤ earns a high prot margin
p  
@C(w;q)
@q , as in imperfectly competitive markets. The output e¤ect can only be ignored if
the plainti¤ is active in a perfectly competitive market, since then p =
@C(w;q)
@q .
The direct cost e¤ect forms the basis for the plainti¤s cartel damages claims in both the
U.S. and Europe. The defendant may subsequently attempt to resort to the pass-on e¤ect
to obtain a discount from the cost e¤ect, at least if this has a legal basis in the jurisdiction.
However, our framework shows that the pass-on e¤ect also implies an output e¤ect. Hence,
if a passing-on defense is allowed the output e¤ect should also be incorporated.
While our framework stresses the role of three key e¤ects from the cartel in general
terms, it does not say anything about their relative magnitudes. In the next sections, we will
introduce additional structure on the competitive conditions in the plainti¤s downstream
market to quantify the relative importance of the three e¤ects. We identify conditions under
which the pass-on e¤ect dominates the output e¤ect. This motivates an adjusted passing-
on defense in the form of easy-to-interpret discounts to the cost e¤ect. We begin with the
simpler case of a common cost increase, where all rms in the plainti¤s downstream market
are symmetrically a¤ected by the price overcharge dw, and subsequently move to the more
complicated setting in which some of the plainti¤s rivals are not a¤ected.
Constant returns to scale
To simplify the exposition, the rest of the paper assumes that the plainti¤ has a constant
returns to scale cost function, C (w;q) = c(w)q = cq.8 This implies that marginal cost is
independent of output,
@C(w;q)
@q = c(w) = c, and that input demand is proportional to total
output, x =
@C(w;q)
@w = c0(w)q. Furthermore, dc = c0(w)dw = x
qdw. The change in the
plainti¤s prots, given by (1), then simplies to:
d =  qdc + qdp + (p   c)dq: (2)
8The assumption of constant marginal cost is not without consequences. If marginal cost would be in-
creasing in output, the extent of pass-on can be expected to be smaller, which would also result in a lower
output e¤ect. The reverse is true if marginal cost is decreasing in output.
6Equation (2) expresses the direct e¤ect of the cartel in terms of the overall marginal cost
increase, dc, instead of the price overcharge, dw. We will follow this practice in the rest of
the paper. To reinterpret our results in terms of the price overcharge dw, simply substitute
dc = x
qdw.
4 Common cost increase
We begin with the situation in which the cartel a¤ects all rms in the plainti¤s industry.
More specically, assume that all rms have the same (constant) marginal cost c prior to
the cartel and are subject to a common marginal cost increase dc due to the cartel. Let the
plainti¤s demand when all rms set the same price p be q = H(p). This is the traditional
Chamberlinian DD curve. Assume this is a constant fraction  of total industry demand
when all rms set the same price, i.e. H(p) = Q(p).9 The industry-level price elasticity of








H(p). Assume that the cost, demand and
competitive conditions generate a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which all
rms sell their output at the same price p. Denote the equilibrium price as a function of the
common marginal cost by p = p(c). Assume this function is increasing in c, and dene the
industry-level pass-on rate by  =
@p(c)
@c > 0. While this set-up imposes much symmetry, it
allows for various sources of market power in the plainti¤s market: product di¤erentiation,
the number of competitors, and the competitive conduct (e.g. Bertrand versus Cournot).
This will be illustrated with specic models below.

















This conrms that the cartel has three e¤ects: a direct cost e¤ect (rst term), and the
pass-on and an output e¤ects (second and third terms). But the additional structure on the
plainti¤s downstream market now enables us to quantify the relative importance of these





9The assumption of a constant fraction generalizes the usual full symmetry assumption that rms obtain
the same fraction of industry demand.
7as the competition intensity parameter for the plainti¤s industry, as in Corts (1999). This
is a number between zero and one, measuring the plainti¤s actual markup
p c
p relative to
the maximum markup it could achieve as a monopolist or as a member of a downstream
cartel (1
"). Substituting the denitions of ",  and  in (3) and rearranging, we can write
the change in the plainti¤s prot due to the cartel as:
d =  (1  (1  ))qdc: (5)
Equation (5) says that the cost e¤ect of the cartel ( qdc) forms a starting basis for computing
cartel damages, but that a discount equal to (1  ) should be applied. Since  > 0 and 
is between zero and one, this discount is positive or zero, but less than the pass-on rate. We
therefore have:
Proposition 1 Consider a symmetric industry with a common cost increase due to the
cartel.The appropriate discount to the direct cost e¤ect su¤ered by the plainti¤ is positive
or z ero,and is given by:
discount = (1  )  0: (6)
An adjusted passing- on def ense is theref ore justi ed,unless the plainti¤ s industry is itself
f ully carteliz ed (  = 1 ) . 10
The downward adjustment of the pass-on rate in computing the discount stems from the
fact that pass-on may lead to a further output e¤ect. In a perfectly competitive industry
( = 0), the output e¤ect is absent since lost sales do not matter at the margin. The discount
to the cost e¤ect is then simply the unadjusted pass-on rate. But as the plainti¤s industry
becomes less competitive ( > 0), the lost sales do matter, and the pass-on rate should be
adjusted downwards. In the extreme case in which the plainti¤s industry is fully cartelized
( = 1 ), the output e¤ect actually fully o¤sets the pass-on e¤ect and the discount to the
cost e¤ect becomes zero. The passing-on defense would thus not be justied in this extreme
case, as has also been observed by Hellwig (2006) and Kosicki and Cahill (2006).
We now apply two standard oligopoly models to the plainti¤s industry to show how
these results can be made operational.
4.1 Bertrand competition
With Bertrand competition in the plainti¤s industry, each rm chooses its price to maximize
its own prots, taking as given the prices set by the other rms. Market power then stems
10While the discount to the direct cost e¤ect is generally positive (unless  = 1), it is not necessarily less
than one. The discount may be greater than one if the pass-on rate > 1 and if  is su¢ciently small. In
this case, the plainti¤ would actually gain from the common cost increase due to the cartel.
8from the degree of product di¤erentiation and the number of competing rms. Let the
plainti¤s own demand when it sets a price p and its rivals all set the same price r be
D(p;r). If p = r, we obtain the Chamberlinian DD curve, D(p;p) = H(p). The rst-order




+ D(p;p) = 0: (7)
Dene the plainti¤s rm-level own-price elasticity of demand, evaluated at equal prices









@p , i.e. the ratio of
the cross-price e¤ect of a price increase by the rivals over the own-price e¤ect. If there are
no income e¤ects, the rms cross-price e¤ects are symmetric, so that  can be interpreted
as the plainti¤s aggregate diversion ratio, i.e. the fraction of the sales lost by the plainti¤
after a price increase that ows back to its rivals in the industry.11 Di¤erentiating D(p;r)
and H(p) and evaluating at equal prices p = r, one can verify that the industry-level price
elasticity " is related to the product-level own-price elasticity  through " = (1   ). The










Substituting this in (4), we obtain  = "
 = 1   . We can then apply the discount formula
(6) to obtain the following corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 In a symmetric Bertrand industry with a common cost increase the appropriate









The rst expression shows that the discount can be obtained by adjusting the pass-
on rate using information on the rm-level and market-level price elasticities of demand.
The second expression is even simpler and shows that the pass-on rate can be adjusted
using information on the plainti¤s aggregate diversion ratio. For example, if  = 6 0% and
 = 5 0%, the defendant can claim a 30% discount from the cost e¤ect due to the cartel.
11To see this formally, we need some additional demand notation. Let Di(p) be rm is own demand


























9Example: logit demand To illustrate, consider the logit model, which has been popular
in many areas of antitrust analysis; see for example Werden and Froeb (1994). There are
N symmetrically di¤erentiated products and one outside good, the no-purchase alternative.
There are L potential consumers who either buy one of the di¤erentiated products, or the
outside good at an exogenous price p0. The plainti¤s own demand as a function of its
own price p and the identical rivals prices r is
D(p;r) =
e x p ( p)
e x p (p0) + e x p ( p) + (N   1)e x p ( r)
L;
and its portion of total industry demand as a function of a common industry price (the
Chamberlinian DD curve) is:
H(p) =
e x p ( p)
e x p (p0) + N e x p ( r)
L = s(p)L;
where s(p) is the plainti¤s market share in the total number of potential consumers. One
can easily verify that  = s(p)(1   s(p))p, and " = s(p)(1   Ns(p))p. This implies that
 =
1 Ns(p)





This discount can be computed using information on the pass-on rate, the number of rms
and the plainti¤s market share in the total number of potential consumers.
4.2 Cournot competition with conj ectural v ariations
Now suppose that the rms in the plainti¤s industry compete according to a homogeneous
goods Cournot model with conjectural variations. Let p = P(Q) denote the inverse industry
demand function, where Q =
PN
i=1 qi is total industry output, i.e. the sum of the quantities
produced by the N rms. In the standard Cournot model each rm chooses its quantity to
maximize its prots, taking as given the quantities of the other rms. In the conjectural
variations extension each rm conjectures that a change in its own quantity induces the
other rms to respond. Let the conjectural variations parameter  be each rms conjectured
change in total output Q when a rm changes its own quantity by one unit. The rst-order
condition dening a symmetric conjectural variations equilibrium is





This condition nests several well-known special cases. If  = 1, each rm conjectures that
total output increases by the same amount as its own quantity (i.e. it takes the quantities
10of the other rms as given), so that the standard Cournot condition obtains. If  = N, each
rm conjectures that each rival will fully match a quantity increase, so that the condition
of a perfect cartel obtains. If  = 0, each rm conjectures that the rivals contract their
quantities in response to a change in its own quantity, in such a way that total output
remains constant. In this case, the condition of perfect competition obtains. Outside such
special cases, the conjectural variations model has little game-theoretic appeal, since it aims
to capture dynamic responses within a static model. It has, however, often been used in
empirical work to estimate the conduct or average collusiveness of rms without having to
specify a full dynamic model. The critical debate on the interpretation and estimation of 
is ongoing, as illustrated by the critical discussions in Bresnahan (1989), Corts (1999) and
Reiss and Wolak (2005). We nevertheless include it here to show how it ts nicely into our
framework for computing discounts to the cost e¤ect.
Using the industry-level price elasticity " =   1
P0(Q)
P(Q)
Q , the conjectural variations equi-









Based on (4), we can compute  = 
N, and apply this to the discount formula to obtain a
second corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 In a symmetric Cournot conjectural variation industry with a common cost








For example, in the standard Cournot model  = 1, so that only information on the
number of rms is required to adjust the pass-on rate and obtain the discount.
5 Firm-specic cost increase
In a variety of settings it is not appropriate to assume that the cartel leads to a cost increase
common to all rms in the plainti¤s industry. First, one or more of the cartel members
may be vertically integrated and therefore also be active as a downstream competitor in the
plainti¤s industry. Such a rm could then decide to favour its own downstream unit and
only charge a high input price to the downstream competitors.12 To the extent that such
12It is not obvious whether a vertically integrated rm would actually have an incentive to engage in such
foreclosure; see e.g. Rey and Tirole (2006). So in real antitrust cases this should be separately investigated
on a case by case basis.
11behavior would occur, the plainti¤ experiences a competitive disadvantage relative to some
of its rivals, so that it is no longer appropriate to apply the above analysis of a common cost
increase.
Second, the cartel members may not be able to perfectly control the supply of their
input. Some of the plainti¤s downstream competitors may be able to purchase their inputs
from suppliers outside the cartel, or from foreign suppliers if the cartel is national, etc. The
plainti¤ then also su¤ers a competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals, so that the analysis
of a common cost increase is no longer valid.
This motivates an analysis of rm-specic cost increases due to the cartel. The general
framework of section 3 still applies, i.e. there is a direct cost e¤ect, a pass-on e¤ect and an
output e¤ect. However, the relative magnitudes of these e¤ects no longer follow the simple
relations obtained for common cost increases in section 4. In particular, the output e¤ect
becomes potentially more important since the plainti¤ loses to other rms in its industry as
it passes on part of the cost increase. As we will show, it is even possible that the output
e¤ect dominates the pass-on e¤ect.
To obtain concrete insights on rm-specic cost increases, we rst consider a Bertrand
model with di¤erentiated products and subsequently a Cournot model with homogeneous
products.
5.1 Bertrand competition
There are N price-setting rms, i = 1N, selling di¤erentiated products. Let I be the set
of insiders, i.e. the rms who are a¤ected by the cartel. One of the insiders is the plainti¤,
denoted by rm 1. Each rm i sells a single product and sets a price pi, operating at a
constant marginal cost ci. Firm is prots in the but-for world (without the cartel) are
i = (pi   ci)Di(p);
where qi = Di(p) is its demand, as a function of the N  1 price vector p = (p1 pN).
Demand is downward sloping
@Di(p)
@pi < 0, products are gross substitutes
@Di(p)
@pk > 0 for k 6= i,





the Jacobian is negative-denite. Let the diversion ratio between the plainti¤ rm 1 and any







@p 1 . This is the fraction of rm 1 s l ost sal es that
d iv erts to rm k after a p rice increase b yrm 1. Fu rthermore, l et rm 1 s ag g reg ate d iv ersion




1 < 1,i.e. the fraction of rm 1 s l ost sal es that  ows to other rms
within the ind u stry .1 3
13This is the same as the ag g reg ate div ersion ratio  denedearl ier in the sy mmetric framework .




+ Di (p) = 0; i = 1   N ( 11)
and assume that the second-order conditions are satised. Denote the equilibrium price
vector, the solution to ( 11) , as a function of the marginal cost vector c = (c1    cN), i.e.





and assume that these are all positive, i.e. k
i > 0 for all i; k. Furthermore, let rm ks





i, i.e. rm ks pass-on rate with respect to a cost
increase of all insiders i 2 I.
We are interested in the e¤ect of the cartel on the plainti¤ rm 1s prots. Firm 1s





Assume that the cartel raises all insiders marginal costs by the same amount as the plainti¤
and does not a¤ect the outsiders marginal costs, i.e. dci =dc1 for i 2 I and dci = 0 for






































This reconrms that the cartel has three e¤ects. The rst term is the cost e¤ect and propor-
tional to minus rm 1s sales,  q1. The second term is the pass-on e¤ect. I t is positive and
proportional to rm 1s sales, multiplied by the ex tent to which rm 1 passes on the insiders
marginal cost increases. The third term is the output e¤ect. I t is proportional to rm 1s
prot margin, multiplied by the ex tent to which rm 1 loses sales through the equilibrium
price responses of all rms ( both the insiders and outsiders) .
We now show that the positive pass-on e¤ect dominates the output e¤ect, so that an
adj usted passing-on defense is valid under the general conditions of the Bertrand model.




@p1 in the prot change ( 12) . Then apply the denitions of the diversion ratios 
k
1



















I +  + 
N
1 N
I . S ince 
k
1 > 0 for k 6= 1 and k
I > 0, this discount is generally
positive. We therefore have:
Proposition 2 Consider a Bertrand industry with a cost increase due to the cartel to the
set ofinsiders I only,includingthe p lainti¤  rm 1 .The ap p rop riate discount to the direct









I > 0: (14 )
An adj usted p assing - on def ense is theref ore j usti ed. 14
The discount to the direct cost e¤ect (14 ) reects the combined pass-on and output
e¤ects. Intuitively, it is equal to a weighted-average of the insider-level pass-on rates over all
rms except the plainti¤ rm 1, where the weights are the diversion ratios with respect to
rm 1. The adjusted passing-on defense should however be carefully interpreted. It is not the
fact that plainti¤ rm 1 is able to pass on the insiders cost increase that justies resorting
to the passing-on defense. This term is actually only a second-order e¤ect because it is fully
compensated by an output e¤ect.15 In contrast, it is that fact that all other rms than the
plainti¤ also raise their prices in response to the insiders cost increases that justies the
passing-on defense. These other rms price responses are rst-order e¤ects and raise the
plainti¤s prots through increased output.
The question of practical interest is of course how to measure the discount to the direct
e¤ect (14 ). A rst approach is to obtain an econometric estimate of the insider-level pass-on
rates for all rms that are active in the downstream market. The discount can then be
computed from (14 ) using quantitative or qualitative information on the diversion ratios as
weights. This approach may require a substantial amount of information in practice. As an
alternative, one may make additional assumptions to obtain a more explicit expression of
the discount formula. We discuss two examples next.
I de ntic a lrms without the c a rte l S uppose that all rms in the plainti¤s industry
are identical in the but-for world, and are correspondingly in a symmetric Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium. The cartel subsequently raises the insiders marginal costs and leaves the other
rms una¤ected. With identical rms in the but-for world, the insider-level pass-on rates
14The discount may be greater than one if some of the pass-on rates k
I > 1 and the corresponding diversion
ratios 
k
1 are su¢ciently close to 1.






@c i cancels out
with part of the output term in (12).
14are all equal, i.e. k





discount formula (14) simplies to
discount = 1
I: (15)
This generaliz es our earlier discount formula (8 ) for the symmetric Bertrand industry with
a common cost increase. The crucial di¤erence is that the insider-level pass-on rate I now
enters instead of the industry-level pass-on rate . Since the insider-level pass-on rate is
typically lower than the industry-level pass-on rate, the discount to the cost e¤ect is clearly
also lower.
Symmetric substitution patterns and logit demand Now allow rms to be di¤erent
but assume that the demand side is characteriz ed by symmetric substitution patterns. This
means that a loss in the market share of plainti¤ rm 1 (or of any other rm) is associated
with an increase in the market shares of the rivals in proportion to their market shares. This
is a property of random utility discrete choice models of demand, when the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is satised. The diversion ratio between rm 1 and




1 s1;where sk is the market share of rm k in the total number












Hence, the discount equals the weighted average of the rivals pass-on rates where the market
shares are the weights. Equivalently, one can interpret this discount as the e¤ect of the
insiders cost increase on the price index for the whole industry except rm 1 (using xed
market shares as weights).
To avoid econometric estimation of the pass-on rates, one may further specify the de-
mand model and compute the pass-on rates as a function of observables or a limited set of
parameters. To illustrate this, consider the earlier discussed logit model of demand, but now
allowing rms to di¤er in quality or costs. The logit model satises the IIA assumption and
correspondingly entails symmetric substitution patterns. In the Appendix we derive explicit
formula for the pass-on rates k
i as a function of observable market shares si, i.e. shares of
each rm i in the total potential sales. Substituting these in (16 ) and rearranging, one can
write the formula for the discount to the cost e¤ect as:
discount =
P
i2I Ti   s1(1   s1)











(1   sk)2 + sk

;
15and s0 is the market share of the outside good.16 This shows that the discount to the
direct cost e¤ect can be computed using only information on the market shares of all rms,
including the outside good, and on the identity of the insiders. While the market share of the
outside good is typically not known, it can be calibrated using information on the market-
level price elasticity of demand. For example, if the market-level elasticity is approximately
zero, then s0 = 0.
One can immediately verify that the logit discount is indeed always positive. In addition,
the discount is always less than 1. Furthermore, it approaches 1 if there is a common cost
increase and perfectly inelastic industry-level demand (i.e. the number of insiders is equal
to N and the market share of the outside good s0 ! 0).
To gain additional intuition on the logit discount formula, Table 1 computes the discounts
for alternative values of the number of rms in the plainti¤s market, the number of outsiders
(not a¤ected by the cartel), and the plainti¤s market share. The table assumes that the
outside good has a market share of 10%, that the plainti¤ rm 1 has a market share of
either 10% or 5 0%, and that the other rms share the rest of the market equally. The
table conrms that the discount is less than 100% but always positive, even if all rms
except the plainti¤ are outsiders (bold numbers on diagonal). We can make three additional
observations. First, a comparison across the rows shows that the discount decreases with the
number of una¤ected outsiders. Second, a comparison across the columns shows that the
discount increases with the degree competition in the plainti¤s market (holding the number
of outsiders constant). Third, a comparison between the left and right panel shows that the
discount is often larger if plainti¤ has a small market share.
5.2 Cournot competition
There are N > 1 quantity-setting rms, selling a homogeneous product. Let I again be the
set of insiders, i.e. the rms a¤ected by the cartel, and let NI be the number of these insiders.
One of the insiders is the plainti¤, again denoted by rm 1. Each rm i = 1N produces
a quantity qi at a constant marginal cost ci > 0. Total industry output is Q =
PN
k=1 qk




N. Let the inverse industry
demand function be p = P(Q), with P 0(Q) < 0. The price elasticity of industry demand is
" =   1
P0(Q)
P(Q)
Q . A measure of the curvature of industry demand is the elasticity of the slope
of the inverse demand curve, i.e.  =  P 00(Q)
Q
P0(Q);see e.g. Vives (19 9 9 ). If  < 0, demand
16The market share of the outside good enters the discount formula di¤erently from the other shares,
because the price of this product remains constant after the cost change unlike the prices of the other
products.
16is concave; if  = 0, demand is linear; and if  > 0, demand is convex. A well-known example
of convex demand is the constant elasticity demand case, for which  = 1+"
" .17 Each rm i
chooses to produce its quantity qi to maximize prots
i = (P(Q)   ci)qi;
taking as given the quantities chosen by the rival rms. The system of necessary rst-order
conditions dening a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is
P(Q)   ci + P
0(Q)qi = 0; i = 1N: (18)
Assume that P 0(Q)+P 00(Q)qi  0 for all i. Given constant marginal costs ci, this assumption
ensures the existence of a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium.18 The assumption is equivalent
to 1 si  0 for all i, where si = qi=Q is rm is market share. It also implies that N   0.
To perform comparative statics of the cost increase due to the cartel, rst dene the
equilibrium quantities and price as a function of the marginal costs. Adding up the rst-
order conditions gives
(P(Q)   c)N + P
0(Q)Q = 0: (19)
Under the above assumptions, the left-hand-side of (19) is decreasing in Q and c and implic-
itly denes the equilibrium industry output function, Q = Q (c), decreasing in c. Further-
more, using the inverse industry demand function we can also dene the equilibrium price
function p = p(c) = P(Q(c)), increasing in c. Implicitly di¤erentiating (19), using the






N + 1   
: (20 )









Note that  > 0 since N + 1    > N     0. Note also that pass-on is incomplete, i.e.
 < 1, if and only if  < 1. Finally, substituting Q = Q(c) in the rst-order condition (18)
gives
P(Q
(c))   ci + P
0(Q
(c))qi = 0: (21)
Equation (21) implicitly denes rm is equilibrium output function qi = q
i (c;ci). Under
the above assumptions (21) is decreasing in qi, increasing in c and decreasing in ci, so that
q
i (c;ci) is increasing in c and decreasing in ci.
17An often-used related measure for the demand curvature is the elasticity of the elasticity. This is dened
by E = "0(Q) 1
P 0(Q)
P(Q)
"(Q) . It can be veried that  = "+1 E
" . Our measure gives simpler expressions below.
18Vives (1999) provides a more detailed discussion of these and weaker conditions for the existence, unique-
ness and stability of Cournot equilibrium.
17As before, we are interested in the e¤ect of the cartel on the plainti¤ rm 1s prots.
Firm 1s equilibrium prots in the but-for world can be written as a function of the average
of all rms marginal costs c and its own marginal cost c1:
1 (c;c1) = (p
 (c)   c1)q

1 (c;c1):
Assume again that the cartel a¤ects all insiders marginal costs by the same amount as the
plainti¤ and does not a¤ect the other rms, dci =dc1 for i 2 I and dci = 0 for i = 2 I. The







































The rst term is the direct cost e¤ect of the cartel and is clearly negative. The second term
is the insider-level pass-on e¤ect and it is positive since  > 0. Using (20), it can be written
as q1
NI
N , i.e. it is proportional to the industry-wide pass-on rate times the fraction of insider
rms
NI
N . The third term is the output e¤ect and is typically negative.
We now show that in contrast to the Bertrand model, the negative output e¤ect may
be so strong that it actually dominates the positive pass-on e¤ect. This implies that the
discount to the cost e¤ect may actually be negative, i.e. the plainti¤ may actually incur
damages that are larger than the direct cost e¤ect. A passing-on defense may therefore no
longer necessarily be justied.
To see this, we follow the same approach as in the Bertrand case and rewrite rm 1s
prot change (22), after substituting rm 1s rst-order condition from (18), substituting

















Equation (23) implies that the cost e¤ect of the cartel ( q1dc1) should be discounted by
the amount
2 s1
N+1 NI   1. It is easy to see that this discount is not necessarily positive, i.e.
the pass-on e¤ect may be fully dominated by the output e¤ect. For example, under linear
demand ( = 0) the discount is negative if and only if the number of NI < N+1
2 . As another
example, under constant and unitary elasticity demand (" = 1 and  = 1 + 1
" = 2) the
18discount is negative if and only if NI < N 1
2(1 s1). Intuitively, in the Cournot model negative
discounts to the direct e¤ect may arise and invalidate the passing-on defense because the
outsiders respond aggressively by expanding their output when the plainti¤ and the other
insiders reduce output after the cost increase. These aggressive output responses may make
the output e¤ect fully dominate the pass-on e¤ect. We therefore have:
Proposition 3 Consider a Cournot industry with a cost increase due to the cartel to the
set of insiders I only, including the plainti¤ rm 1. The appropriate discount to the direct
cost e¤ect su¤ered by plainti¤ rm 1 may be positive or negative, and is given by
discount =
2   s1
N + 1   
NI   1 ? 0 (24)
An adjusted passing-on defense is therefore not necessarily justied.1 9
Th ed i s c o u n tf o r mu l a(24) i swr i t t e ni nt e r mso ft h ed e ma n dc u r v a t u r ec o n d i t i o n. Us i n g
(20 ),i ti sh o we v e ra l s opo s s i b l et or e wr i t ei ti nt e r mso ft h ep a s s - o nr a t e.Th i sg i v e s :
d i s c o u n t= (1   s1)
NI
N
   (1   Ns1)(1  
NI
N




Th i sf o r mu l ama ybep r e f e r r e d i f i sd i ¢c u l tt oo b s e r v ea n d i n s t e a d a n e s t i ma t eo f i s
a v a i l a b l e .Th i si sa l s oh o w wee x p r e s s e dt h ed i s c o u n tf o r mu l a sf o rt h eBe r t r a n dmo d e lo rf o r
t h es y mme t r i cmo d e l swi t hac o mmo nc o s ti n c r e a s e . 20
Be c a u s eo ft h eCo u r n o ta s s u mp t i o n 1   si  0 f o ra l li,weh a v e
2 s 1
N+1  > 0.Th i s
i mme d i a t e l yi mp l i e st h a tt h ed i s c o u n t(24) i n c r e a s e sa st h en u mbe ro fi n s i d e r sNI i n c r e a s e s .
I ti sn o to b v i o u s , h o we v e r , h o wma n yi n s i d e r sa r er e q u i r e df o rt h ed i s c o u n tt obe c o mepo s i t i v e
a n dap a s s i n g - o nd e f e n s et obej u s t i  e d .Th i sd e pe n d so nt h ep l a i n t i ¤ sma r k e ts h a r es1,o n
t h en u mbe ro f r msN a n de s pe c i a l l yo nt h ec u r v a t u r eo fd e ma n d,o fwh i c hbo t ht h es i g n
a n d t h ema g n i t u d ea r eu n k n o wn a n d d i ¢c u l tt ome a s u r ee mp i r i c a l l y(s i n c ei tc a p t u r e sa
s e c o n d - o r d e rp r o pe r t yo ft h ed e ma n dc u r v e ).Wec a nn e v e r t h e l e s ss h o w:
Proposition 4 ( a)I n a Cournot industry with a common cost increase ( NI = N) ,the
discount is positiv e and hence an adjusted passing-on defense is justied unless  <  (N  1)





( b )I n a Cournot industry with a cost increase to the plainti¤only ( NI = 1) ,the discount






19Fur t he r mo r e ,t hedi s c o un tma ybeg r e a t e rt ha no ne ,i fde ma ndi ss u¢c i e n t l yc o n v e x .
20No t et ha ti ft hec o s ti nc r e a s ea ppl i e st oa l lr msNI = N,a ndt hepl a i n t i ¤ha sas y mme t r i cma r k e ts ha r e
s1 = 1
N,t hes e c o nda ndt hi r dt e r msv a ni s hs ot ha tt hedi s c o un tr e duc e st oo ure a r l i e rs y mme t r i cCo ur no t
f o r mul a(1 0 ) (wi t h = 1 ).
1 9Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6provides easy to interpret necessary and su¢cient conditions under which
the passing-on defense is justied after a common cost increase (NI = N) and not justied
after a cost increase to the plainti¤ only (NI = 1). While a cost increase to the plainti¤
only is clearly not representative for most cartels, it serves as a benchmark to stress that a
passing-on defense against a Cournot plainti¤ is only valid if a su¢ciently large number of
rms is a¤ected by the cartel.
Proposition 6can be simplied to the following possible su¢cient conditions:
Corol l a ry 3 For the Cournot industry suppose that one of the following conditions applies:
(i)  (N  1)    N  1 or eq uivalently 1
2 <  < N
2 ;or (ii) s1  1
N. An adjusted passing-on
defense is then always justied after a common cost increase (NI = N) and never justied
after a cost increase to the plainti¤ only (NI = 1).
Proof. The demand curvature condition  (N   1)    N   1 follows immediately
from Proposition 6 , and is equivalent to the condition on the pass-on rate 1
2    N
2 by
(20). The market share condition s1  1
N also follows immediately, since both market share
thresholds in Proposition 6are below 1
N.
The demand curvature condition on  (or the equivalent pass-on rate condition) is satised
for a wide range of demand functions, including linear and exponential demand, but not
necessarily under constant elasticity demand. The market share condition generaliz es our
earlier result of Corollary 2 that the passing-on defense is justied in a symmetric Cournot
model with a common cost increase:21 this continues to be true in an asymmetric Cournot
model as long as the plainti¤ has a higher than average market share. In sum, under a
wide variety of circumstances the passing-on defense is justied when all rms are a¤ected
by the cost increase, and not justied when only the plainti¤ is a¤ected. This shows the
key importance of assessing how many rms have been a¤ected by the cost increase before
resorting to the passing-on defense in a Cournot industry.
Spe c icfunc tiona lforms of de ma nd A more concrete picture of the discount formula
(24) and our subsequent results emerges from specic functional forms of demand. Consider
Genesove and Mullins (1998 ) demand specication Q = (   p), according to which the
demand curvature is  =
 1
 . This specication nests various special demand functions with
an increasingly convex curvature: linear demand ( = 1, so that  = 0), quadratic demand
21This is the special case for which NI = N and si = 1
N for all i.
20( = 2, so that  = 1
2), exponential demand (;  ! 1, 
 constant, so that  = 1), and
log-linear or constant elasticity demand ( = 0,  < 0, so that  = 1 + 1
". We then have
incomplete pass-on ( < 1) for linear and quadratic demand;complete pass-on ( = 1) for
exponential demand;and more than complete pass-on ( > 1) for log-linear demand.
Table 2 computes the discount to the direct cost e¤ect for these four demand specica-
tions, for alternative values of the number of rms N, the number of outsiders not a¤ected
by the cartel N   NI, and the plainti¤s market share s1 (either 10% or 5 0%).22 Table 2
conrms our ndings summarized in Propositions 5and 6 and Corollary 7 . In contrast to
the Bertrand model, the discount to the cost e¤ect is not generally positive. It is, however,
positive for a common cost increase (no outsiders, on rst row of each panel). It decreases as
the number of outsiders increases and it is almost always negative for a cost increase to the
plainti¤ only (all rms but the plainti¤ are outsiders, bold numbers on diagonal).23 Table
2 also illustrates how the discount varies in a complex way with the number of competing
rms N, the plainti¤s market share s1 and especially how this interacts with the demand
curvature . When the plainti¤ has a small market share of 10%, the most conservative
discounts obtain in the linear demand case, and they increase as demand becomes more
convex. The reverse is true however when the plainti¤ has a large market share of 5 0% and
the number of rms is su¢ciently large (6 or 10).24 This discussion shows the importance
of a robustness analysis in applying the passing-on defense when the demand curvature  is
not observed. Alternatively, one may indirectly retrieve  from an empirical estimate of the
pass-on rate  and applying the pass-on formula (20).
6 The cartels total harm
Our analysis has so far exclusively looked at the cartels e¤ects on the plainti¤s prots. In a
recent paper, Basso and Ross (2007 ) take a di¤erent focus and analyze the total harm of the
cartel. This is the harm to all a¤ected parties, i.e. all rms (including the plainti¤) and the
22The elasticity is irrelevant for the results in all specications, except under log-linear demand. In that
case, we set it equal to 2 so that  = 1 + 1
" = 3
2.
23There is only one case with a positive discount (23 %) after a cost increase to the plainti¤, i.e. under the
log-linear demand with N = 2 , NI = 1 and plainti¤s market share s1 = 0 :1. In this case, the two possible
su¢cient conditions of Corollary 7are violated since (i)  = 3
2 > 1, and s1 = 0 :1 > 1
2.
24Furthermore, for linear and quadratic demand the discount increases as the number of competing rms
N increases, as in the Bertrand case. This is also true for exponential demand if there is at least one
outsider. However, for exponential demand without an outsider the discount is independent of the number
of competitors. Furthermore, for log-linear demand, the discount may actually decrease as competition
increases.
21nal consumers purchasing from the rms. Interestingly, Basso and Ross also relate their
ndings to the traditional cost e¤ect, arguing that the total harm is larger for two reasons.
First, the cartel generates a deadweight loss associated with the output reduction. Second,
the cartel generates an additional harm because the rms purchasing from the cartel are not
the nal consumers. Our framework essentially treats the rst reason (deadweight loss) as a
second-order e¤ect, since it considered  smallcartel overcharges dc.25 The second reason,
and Basso and Ross main point, is however a rst-order e¤ect, and we now show how it
relates to our own framework, and in particular to the output e¤ect.
We return to the case of a common cost increase of section 4, but now consider the cartels
e¤ect on all rms (including the plainti¤) and on the consumers. As before, total industry
demand when all rms set the same price p is Q = Q(p). Furthermore, let aggregate consumer
surplus be v(p). The industry equilibrium price as a function of the common marginal cost
c is again p = p(c). Total surplus as a function of marginal cost c is the sum of aggregate
industry prots (c) and aggregate consumer surplus v(p(c)):

























First, the cartels e¤ect on aggregate prots consists of an aggregate cost, pass-on and output
e¤ect. This parallels our previous analysis of the plainti¤s prot; see (3) in section 4. Second,
the e¤ect on consumers is the pass-on e¤ect, as transferred by the rms purchasing from the
cartel. Applying the aggregate version of Roys identity, Q =  
@v(p)
@p , and using our earlier
dened price elasticity of demand ", pass-on rate  and competition intensity parameter ,
the cartels total harm can be written as:
dS =  (1   (1   ))Qdc + Qdc
=  (1 + )Qdc: (25)
25This does not mean, however, that the deadweight loss is not important in practice. On the basis
of public information on approximately 300 cartels, Connor (2004) nds a median cartel overcharge of 25%
across all types of cartels over all time periods. On the basis of evidence from the trade press, Levenstein and
Suslow (2006, p80) report price overcharges ranging from 10 to 100% for international cartels. Hellwig (2006)
and Leslie (2006) discuss the economics and legal implications of accounting for the cartels deadweight loss.
Incorporating it in our framework would entail integrating over the small overcharges dc. This does not give
general closed form solutions, but simulation analysis based on specic functional forms would provide an
alternative solution (as in merger analysis).
22The nal consumers are hurt by the extent of pass-on , but this is merely a transfer from the
cartels purchasers so it cancels out in the second line of (25). The total harm is therefore
the direct cost e¤ect, plus a percentage premium . In fact, this premium re ects the
output e¤ect that was also used in the downward adjustment of the discount when applying
a passing-on defense to the purchaser plainti¤. We therefore have:
Proposition 5 Consider a symmetric industry with a common cost increase due to the
cartel. The total harm from the cartel consists of the aggregate direct cost e¤ect, plus a
percentage premium of . This premium reects the output e¤ect.
It is straightforward to generalize Proposition 5 to allow for one or multiple layers of
indirect purchaser industries.26
The result that the total harm from the cartel is larger than the aggregate cost e¤ect is
consistent with Basso and Ross (2007). We show how this premium (or multiplier as they
call it) re ects the output e¤ect and can be nicely written in terms of the pass-on rate 
and our competition intensity parameter .27 Interestingly, an adjusted passing-on defense
against the purchaser plainti¤s may therefore actually turn against the defendant, since the
evidence required to adjust for the output e¤ect in the passing-on defense may also be used
to demonstrate by how much the cartels total harm exceeds the direct cost e¤ect.
7 Concludingdiscussion
We have developed a general economic framework to assess cartel damages to a purchaser
plainti¤, starting from the anticompetitive price overcharge (or direct cost e¤ect) as the
commonly used basis. We have identied the circumstances under which an adjusted passing-
on defense against the purchaser plainti¤ is justied. This defense takes into account that
26Consider an upstream industry consisting of the cartels direct purchasers and a downstream industry
consisting of the indirect purchasers. Aggregate prots in the downstream industry are D(w) = (p(w)  
w)Q(p(w)), where p(w) is the equilibrium price as a function of the wholesale price w. Aggregate prots
in the upstream industry are U(c) = (w(c)   c)Q(p(w(c))), where w(c) is the equilibrium wholesale
price as a function of marginal cost c. Add up aggregate upstream and downstream prots and aggregate
consumer surplus, and di¤erentiate with respect to c. This gives the same total harm formula (25), where
 should be interpreted as the overall markup of direct and indirect purchasers (p   c), multiplied by the
elasticity of nal industry demand, and  should be reinterpreted as the combined pass-on rate of the direct
and indirect purchasers.
27Our discussion of Basso and Ross is clearly stylized and is only intended to relate it to our own framework.
We refer to Basso and Ross (2007) for more specic results, and computations of the premium under specic
models of oligopoly and demand.
23any pass-on of the price overcharge by the plainti¤ may subsequently also lead to a reduction
in its output. While incorporating this output e¤ect inevitably complicates the analysis, the
informational requirements increase only moderately relative to a simple passing-on defense
that ignores the output e¤ect. In particular, we derive explicit formulas for the discount to the
cost e¤ect under a wide variety of circumstances. These include various models of imperfect
competition, and allow for either common cost increases to all of the plainti¤s competitors
or cost increases to only a subset of them. We note, however, that a proper account of the
output e¤ect in the passing-on defense may actually turn against the defendant, when one
considers the cartels total harm (i.e. including the e¤ect on nal consumers).
Our suggested discount formulas depend on relatively easy-to-observe variables for the
purchaser plainti¤s industry. They naturally lead to two empirical approaches. The rst is
a reduced-form approach and relates most closely to a traditional pass-on analysis. It entails
estimating the appropriate pass-on rate (rm-specic of industry wide) and then adjusting
that pass-on rate based on our derived discount formulas for alternative industries.28 The
second approach is the structural approach. This requires substituting the pass-on rate out of
the discount formulas (in those cases where we have not already done so), and then amounts
to estimating all relevant supply and demand parameters entering the discount formula.29
Our analysis is particularly timely in light of the recent recommendations of the U.S.
Antitrust Modernization Commission and the e¤orts by the European Commission to stim-
ulate private cartel damages claims. Both authorities recommend making private damages
claims in line with the actually lost prots. A question that then arises is whether it would
not be better to directly focus on estimating lost prots, rather than follow an indirect ap-
proach which starts from the anticompetitive price overcharge and subsequently computes
discounts. In principle, both approaches should be equivalent. From a practical point of view,
however, focusing on the measurement of the anticompetitive price overcharge may entail
an important advantage. There is extensive experience with estimating the anticompetitive
price overcharge based on the econometric estimation of the but-for price; as reviewed
28The empirical literature on estimating pass-on rates is very large, and relates to various areas, including
the literature on exchange rate pass-through literature, on tax incidence, on price transmission in agricultural
economics, and on market power and competition. See Stennek and Verboven (2005) for an overview. A
paper of particular interest in our context is by Ashenfelter, Ashmore, Baker and McKerman (1998), showing
how to empirically estimate the rm-specic pass-through rate (in the context of evaluating e¢ciency gains
from mergers).
29For example, Proposition 4 writes the Bertrand discount (14) in terms of pass-on rates but our subsequent
logit example in section 5.1 eliminates the pass-on rate and writes the discount formulas in terms of demand
parameters and market shares. Conversely, Proposition 5 writes the Cournot discount formula (24) in terms
of a demand curvature parameter and market variables, but we subsequently rewrite it in terms of the
pass-on rate and market variables.
24in e.g. van Dijk and Verboven (2007) or Davis and Garces (2007). Applying a passing-on
defense to this overcharge then shifts the burden of proof to the cartel, who should collect
the information on the pass-on e¤ect and the proper adjustment for the output e¤ect. It
is likely that the defendant would use this defense with care, since the same evidence may
actually also be used to show that the cartels total harm is higher than the traditional cost
e¤ect.
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9 Appendix.
9.1 The logit model
The potential number of consumers is L. Each consumer may buy one of the N di¤erentiated
products or the outside good. The demand for product i = 1N is Di(p) = si(p)L, where
si = si(p) are the market shares given by
si(p) =
e x p (vi   pi)
1 +
PN
k=1 e x p (vk   pk)
:
The market share of the outside good 0 is simply s0(p) = 1 
PN
i=1 si(p), so that the demand
for the outside good is D0(p) = s0(p)L. The market share derivatives are
@si(p)
@pi
= si(1   si)
@sk(p)
@pi
= sisk for k 6= i:

























If the pass-on rates are known or estimated, this can be used to calculate the discount.
Alternatively, the pass-on rates can be computed by performing comparative statics on the
system of rst-order conditions dening the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium:





= 0 for all i:
To perform the comparative statics of a cost increase by rm i on prices, totally di¤erentiate
this system with respect to pk, k = 1N, and ci. The tedious calculations are somewhat
similar to Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, p. 266-267), except that the comparative
statics are in cost rather than in quality and that an outside good is included. This results
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(1   sk)2 + sk

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@c i , i.e. Ti can be interpreted as the e¤ect of a cost increase of rm
i on the industry price index, using market shares as weights. Inserting the pass-on e¤ects
in k






  s1(1   s1)
(1   s1)2 + s1
:
This can be computed based on information on the market shares of all products including
the outside good.
9.2 Proof of proposition 4
The assumptions of the Cournot model involve the following inequalities: (i) s1  1, (ii) 
N, (iii) N > 1 and (iv) 0 < s1 < 1. To show the proposition, we have to derive the sign of
the discount (24) or equivalently the sign of 2NI   N   1   (s1NI   1) under (a) NI = N
and (b) NI = 1.
28To show (a), we have to show that N 1 (s1N 1) > 0. Consider all possible cases for .
First, if  > 1, then N 1 s1N+  N 1 N+ =  1 > 0 by (i). Second, if 0    1
and s1N 1  0, then N 1 (s1N 1)  N 1 (s1N 1) = N(1 s1) > 0 by (iv). Third,
if 0    1 and s1N  1 < 0, then N  1 (s1N  1)  N  1 > 0 by (iii). Fourth, if  < 0
and s1N  1  0, then N  1 (s1N  1)  N  1 > 0 by (iii). Fifth, if  (N  1)   < 0
and s1N   1 < 0, then N   1   (s1N   1)  N   1 + (N   1)(s1N   1) = (N   1)s1N > 0
by (iii). Finally, if  <  (N  1) and s1N  1 < 0, then N  1 (s1N  1) > 0 is equivalent




( ). This shows that the discount is always





To show (b), we have to show that 1   N + (1   s1) < 0. Consider again all possible
cases for . First, if   0, then 1 N +(1 s1)  1 N < 0 by (iii). Second, if 0 <   1,
then 1 N +(1 s1) < 1 N +  1 N +1  0 by (iii). Third, if  > 1 and s1N  1  0,
then 1 N +(1 s1) < 1 N +N(1 s1) = 1 s1N  0 by (ii). Fourth, if N  1 >  > 1
and s1N   1 < 0, then 1   N + (1   s1) < 1   N + (N   1)(1   s1) =  (N   1)s1 < 0 by
(iii). Finally, if  > (N  1) and s1N  1 < 0, then 1 N +(1 s1) < 0 is equivalent to the




 . This shows that the discount is always negative





29Table 1: Discount to the cost e¤ect of the cartel: Bertrand competition
Plainti¤s market share: 10% Plainti¤s market share: 50%
Outsiders Number of rms in the plainti¤s market
2 6 10 2 6 10
logit demand
0 52% 87% 88% 71% 79% 79%
1 33% 70% 78% 15% 6 3 % 71 %
5  2% 4 0%  2% 3 6 %
9   1%   1%
No t e s :Th en u mbe r sa r eb a s e do nt h ed i s c o u n tf o r mu l a( 1 7) .Th ema r k e ts h a r e sa r e
a sf o l l o ws :o u t s i d eg o o d= 1 0%;p l a i n t i ¤= 1 0% o r50%;o t h e r r ms :i d e n t i c a ls h a r e
o fr e ma i n i n gp a r t .Th en u mbe r si nbo l dr e f e rt oc o mmo nc o s ti n c r e a s e s( a l l r msa r e
i n s i d e r s ) .
3 0Table 2: Discount to the cost e¤ect of the cartel: Cournot competition
Plainti¤ s market share: s1 = 10% Plainti¤ s market share: s1 = 5 0%
Outsiders Number of rms in the downstream market (N)
(N   NI) 2 6 10 2 6 10
linear demand ( = 0,so  = N
N+1)
0 33% 71% 82% 33% 71% 82%
1 -33% 43% 64% -33% 43% 64%
5 -71% - 9% -71% - 9%
9 -82% -82%
q uadratic demand ( = 1
2,so  = N
N+1=2)
0 56% 80% 86% 40% 62% 67%
1 -22% 50% 67% -30% 35% 50%
5 -70% - 7% -73% - 17%
9 -81% -83%
ex ponential demand ( = 1,so  = 1)
0 90% 90% 90% 50% 50% 50%
1 -5% 58% 71% -25% 25% 35%
5 -68% - 5% -75 - 70%
9 -81% -85%
log- linear demand with " = 2( = 3
2,so  = N
N 1=2)
0 147% 102% 95% 67% 36% 32%
1 23% 68% 75% -17% 14% 18%
5 -66% - 3% -77% - 31%
9 -81% -87%
Notes: The numbers are based on the discount formula (24) after substituting the
relev ant demand parameters . The market shares are as follows: plainti¤ = 10% or
50%; other rms: identical share of remaining part. The numbers in bold refer to
common cost increases (all rms are insiders).
31